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Abstract 
 
Power grids and pipeline networks at all latitudes are known to be at risk from the 
natural hazard of geomagnetically induced currents. At a recent workshop in South 
Africa, UK and South African scientists and engineers discussed the current 
understanding of this hazard, as it affects major power systems in Europe and 
Africa. They also summarised, to better inform the public and industry, what can be 
said with some certainty about the hazard and what research is yet required to 
develop useful tools for geomagnetic hazard mitigation. 
 
 
Background 
 
Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are a natural hazard that can affect 
conducting infrastructures, such as power grids and pipelines (e.g. Boteler et al, 
1998; Kappenman, 1996, 2004; Pirjola, 2002). GICs are a direct result of solar 
activity, which gives rise to space weather and consequently to geomagnetic 
storms. Besides power grids and pipelines, space weather can disrupt 
communications, use of the global positioning system (GPS), and pose risks to 
satellite and spacecraft operations. (Recent summaries on the space weather 
hazard can be found in, for example, Lanzerotti et al, 1999; Pirjola et al, 2005; 
Thomson, 2007; Eastwood, 2008) 
 
The origin of GICs and space weather lies in the Sun’s magnetic activity cycle. The 
most significant solar phenomenon for space weather is a ‘coronal mass ejection’ 
(CME). Heading Earthward in one to three days, CMEs evolve as they interact with 
the ambient solar wind flow. When CMEs impact the Earth’s protective 
magnetosphere, their energy and electrical plasma boost existing magnetospheric 
currents. These current systems cause large magnetic variations that induce 
electric fields in the solid Earth. These fields, in turn, generate the GICs that flow in 
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conducting pipes and wires, in ways influenced by the electrical properties of each 
network. 
 
There is much documented and anecdotal evidence of the effects of GICs on the 
power systems of the developed world (e.g. Bolduc, 2002; Molinksi, 2002; 
Pulkkinen et al, 2005; Kappenman, 2005; Trichtchenko et al, 2007). The most 
widely known example of a damaging impact is the collapse of the Hydro Quebec 
power system on 13th March 1989. A severe geomagnetic storm shut down the 
complete high voltage system of Quebec, estimated at within 1 minute and 10 
seconds, with a consequent economic cost and social disruption (Bolduc, 2002). 
More recent storms, for example the October 2003 ‘Halloween’ magnetic storm 
(which resulted in lower latitude auroral activity, as in Figure 1), are also known to 
have affected networks in Europe, North America, South Africa and elsewhere (e.g. 
Pulkkinen et al, 2005; Gaunt and Coetzee, 2007; Thomson et al, 2005). An 
estimate of the present-day economic cost of a repeat of the most severe 
geomagnetic storm known (the ‘Carrington Storm’ of September 1859) has also 
recently been made by the US National Research Council (2008). 
 
Together with the power grid evidence there is now more than thirty years of 
scientific research into the subject (including, recently, Erinmez et al, 2002; 
Kappenman, 2005; Pulkkinen et al, 2005; Wik et al, 2008). Progress has certainly 
been made, in terms of quantifying the Sun-Earth magnetic connection. However 
much remains to be done. In those thirty-plus years it has been found that 
understanding the geomagnetic hazard is a truly cross-disciplinary activity, 
particularly when considering its impact on technology at ground level. There is 
therefore much scope remaining for engagement between solar-, space- and geo-
physicists and the power engineering community, to turn scientific knowledge into 
practical tools for risk assessment and hazard mitigation. 
 
 
A Workshop on the GIC Hazard to Power Grids 
 
In December 2008 the University of Cape Town and the Hermanus Magnetic 
Observatory hosted a workshop in South Africa for a group of UK and South 
African scientists. This workshop was funded by the Royal Society, on behalf of the 
UK government, and by the National Research Foundation, on behalf of the 
government of South Africa. Using their expertise in space physics, geophysics and 
electrical power engineering, the workshop participants spent a week discussing 
issues within the GIC risk to high voltage power grids, in both developed and 
developing countries around the world. Examples of European and African national 
power grids were examined. 
 
One aim of the GIC workshop was the free exchange of ideas, insights and 
knowledge on the natural geomagnetic hazard and on GIC risk. This was for mutual 
education and to help promote future research between the two countries in the 
cross-disciplinary manner suggested above. A second aim of the workshop was to 
summarise the scientific and engineering ‘state of play’ for the power engineering 
industry, for the public and for policy makers. The workshop participants therefore 
compiled a short list of major points that they believed with some confidence that 
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scientists and engineers do know about the GIC risk to electric power systems, as 
well as major things we still don’t know.  
 
In the following sections we list, in relatively simple terms, ten major ‘do knows’ and 
ten major ‘don’t knows’ about GIC risk, together with some short explanatory notes. 
The ten items on each of the two lists are ordered approximately in the time-order 
of CME onset through to power system damage and not in any order of relative 
importance. 
 
 
Ten things we do know about the GIC risk to power grids 
 
1. Solar storms (i.e. CMEs) that lead to high levels of GICs are statistically more 
likely during periods close to solar maximum and in the descending phase of the 
solar cycle, but they do also occur at all other times in the solar activity cycle (as 
identified in Figure 2). 
 
The number of major CMEs varies with the cycle of solar (sunspot) activity. 
However large amplitude eruptions do occur even when the magnetic 
activity cycle is at a minimum, for example in 1986. This means that the GIC 
risk is not restricted to just a few years around the maximum in solar activity. 
It is always present. 
 
2. The magnetospheric and ionospheric currents that drive GICs are different at 
different latitudes (see, for example, the complex and dynamic system of 
ionospheric currents shown in Figure 3 for northern Europe during one major 
storm). 
 
The Earth’s near-space environment (the magnetosphere) contains a 
complex system of diffuse, but large scale electrical currents that connect 
with currents that flow in the ionosphere, in the upper atmosphere. These 
currents are modulated and amplified by solar activity. The structure and 
dynamics of these current systems changes with latitude. Understanding the 
details of the behaviour of these current systems, and their effects, is an 
active research area in space- and geo-physics, though the broad picture is 
widely agreed. For example, at higher latitudes the ‘auroral electrojets’ 
induce largely east-west surface electric fields. In principle, the largest 
voltage difference across a power network should occur in this orientation. 
However it turns out to be incorrect to assume that the largest GICs always 
occur in transmission segments with an east-west orientation; in some cases 
an almost north-south orientation may be more important. 
 
3.  The dominant cause of GICs in power grids is the time rate of change of the 
Earth’s magnetic field. 
 
There are firm theoretical reasons for this, as well as the simple observation 
of a strong linear correlation between the time-rate-of-change of the 
magnetic field and measured GICs, at all latitudes. Accurate prediction of 
GIC risk then requires accurate prediction of changes in the magnetic field 
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(see, for example, Wintoft, 2005). This is still scientifically hard to do. (We 
should note also that recent work has suggested significant correlations 
between GIC and the field itself: Watari et al, 2009.) 
 
4. Interpolating the magnetic field from spatially distributed geomagnetic 
observations improves the prediction accuracy of GICs at any given point, even at 
mid-latitudes (e.g. Bernhardi et al, 2008). This is in comparison with predictions 
made from data from a single magnetic observatory, taken to be representative of 
the ‘regional’ situation.  
 
This follows from point two. The natural magnetic field at any point in a 
power grid, where we need to predict GICs, is mostly affected by those 
magnetospheric and ionospheric currents systems that are closest to it. 
Neighbouring permanent geomagnetic observatories are the best means to 
interpolate geomagnetic activity to a given measurement site. Simplified 
assumptions – such as the so-called ‘plane-wave model’, which is based on 
single-site data – give an incomplete picture of magnetic changes across 
regional scale power grids. In addition, measured GIC at any point may be 
the sum of induction processes in several connected transmission lines. 
 
5.  GICs are larger in countries and regions where the geology is generally more 
resistive (discussed e.g. in Pirjola and Viljanen, 1991). 
 
While the magnitude of the magnetic field change is the most significant 
variable affecting the magnitude of the GICs, higher resistance rock 
increases the natural surface electric field that acts as the voltage source (or 
‘battery’) for GICs, operating in the line between the neighbouring grounding 
points in any given grid (see e.g. Boteler and Pirjola, 1998). Conductivity is a 
function not just of rock type, but also of fluid and mineral content, and 
needs to be considered separately for each power network region.  
 
6. A multi-layered and laterally varying ground conductivity model gives better 
prediction of GICs, than the simpler assumption of an homogeneous Earth (e.g. 
Ngwira et al, 2008; Thomson et al, 2005). 
 
Closer correlation between measured data and scientific models of GICs is 
obtained by using a three-dimensional conductivity model of the Earth.  
 
7. GICs have been demonstrated to affect power systems at all latitudes (see, for 
example, damage to a South African transformer shown in Figure 4). 
 
There is a perception, particularly common within government and industry, 
that GICs are a risk only for power grids at relatively high latitudes. For 
example GICs in the past have been widely reported and analysed in 
Canada, Finland and Scandinavia. GICs have however also been measured 
and reported in more mid-latitude counties such as the UK and USA. The 
workshop participants however also learned of GIC effects and studies in 
South Africa and Brazil, both countries at low geographic and geomagnetic 
latitudes, and learned of anecdotal evidence for GIC impacts elsewhere in 
the world, at all latitudes. Recent research papers from Japan (data from 
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around 44 degrees north: Watari et al, 2009) and China (around 23 degrees 
north: Liu et al, 2009) are testament to this. This means that assessing the 
risk from space weather to our technological infrastructure is a concern for 
all countries.  
 
8. GICs can affect many power transformers simultaneously at multiple points 
across regional and continental scale networks (e.g. GIC data in Figure 3). 
 
This distinguishes global and continental scale space weather impacts from 
localised terrestrial weather impacts such as lightning, ice and severe wind 
storms. GICs require a different approach to the analysis of power system 
failure, in comparison with standard approaches that usually assume 
independence of events initiating system faults (‘contingencies’). 
 
9.  Series capacitors in transmission lines may interrupt GIC flow in power 
networks, but are expensive. However some strategies involving capacitors may 
increase GIC and reactive power demands (e.g. Erinmez et al, 2002). 
 
Engineering and mitigation strategies are known to exist that are intended to 
protect against GIC damage. However this ‘do know’ tells us that any 
network as a whole must be protected. Attempting to protect single or just a 
few assets will merely redistribute GICs and may put other assets at risk. 
Lower-cost mitigation techniques can be implemented instead of series 
capacitors in the transmission lines, but these have other effects on power 
system operation. The capacity to mitigate the impact of GICs might not be 
within the scope or control of independent and individual owners of 
transmission networks and power stations. Careful network planning, 
numerical modelling and testing is suggested in each case. 
 
10. It is possible from transformer dissolved gas analysis to identify GIC-initiated 
damage before complete transformer failure occurs (see, for example, Figure 5). 
This is especially true if the rate of gassing simultaneously increases in widely 
separated transformers across a network. 
 
Excessive heating in a transformer leads to the breakdown of the insulation, 
releasing gas that can be detected. Tracking the changing level of evolved 
gas can indicate the risk of future cumulative damage to each transformer, 
for example while measured GICs remain below warning thresholds. 
 
 
 
Ten things we don’t know about the GIC risk to power grids 
 
 
1. What are the solar and interplanetary events and signatures (peaks, duration, 
location) that are most ‘geo-effective’, in terms of GIC causation. For example what 
significance, if any, can be attached to reported peak solar flare magnitudes, e.g. 
as listed in Table 1, in understanding historical GIC? 
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Scientists have relatively detailed data on solar and interplanetary events 
going back just 40 years or so. We therefore do not yet know the extremes 
to which the Sun can operate or know with certainty which particular 
‘markers’ of solar activity are most relevant. Progress on models of solar and 
solar wind variability is also required. 
 
2. What are the characteristics of extreme geomagnetic storms that pose the 
highest risk to power systems (see, for example, the relation of major storms to the 
sunspot cycle shown in Figure 6)? 
 
This is related to point one. Scientists also have relatively detailed and 
continuous data on geomagnetic events going back to around the 1840s. In 
many respects the ‘Carrington Storm’ (1st September 1859) was a far more 
severe storm than any that has been measured since (see, e.g., US National 
Research Council, 2008). The possibility of another event of a similar 
magnitude to this therefore needs to be carefully considered. All available 
data needs to be fully scanned, digitized and exploited. In particular we note 
that existing published hourly, daily and annual mean geomagnetic data are 
not sufficient to fully analyse GIC hazard: the periods of most interest are 
around a few seconds to a few tens of minutes. 
 
3. In predicting GICs, what is the relative contribution of each of the different 
components of the geomagnetic field (i.e. the horizontal and vertical components 
and of the total field magnitude), as well as the relevance of other data, such as the 
ionospheric total electron content (TEC) and the interplanetary magnetic field 
magnitude and direction (e.g. Pulkkinen et al, 2006)? 
 
We know that each of these factors is either directly relevant or is a useful 
proxy for other relevant data, but more study is required. What is the 
minimum information we need in order to maximise GIC prediction 
accuracy? Can we, for example, derive useful near real time information on 
changing ionospheric current systems from GPS TEC measurements that 
vary with time? 
 
4. What are the definitive spatial and temporal scales of the magnetospheric and 
ionospheric currents that drive significant GICs in grids? 
 
GICs respond to magnetic variations on many timescales. At this time it is 
believed that the dominant periods of interest are probably a few seconds to 
tens of minutes. How detailed do our ionospheric and magnetospheric 
current models therefore need to be, in time and space, to capture the 
physics of the problem? 
 
5. What is an adequate number and distribution of magnetometers for GIC 
modeling in the UK and South Africa (and similarly for other countries)? 
 
This is related to point four. Can we define guidelines that help developed 
and developing countries, wherever they are, to set up networks of 
magnetometers; or do we need to approach the problem on a case by case 
basis, with regard to latitude, geology, geophysics and space physics? 
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6. Which information, given on what timescale, is most useful for any given power 
utility/ authority to manage its GIC risk?  
 
CMEs take between just under one day and perhaps up to 3-4 days to reach 
the Earth. The solar physics underpinning CME formation and release is not 
well understood and predictive models of CMEs are limited in their 
capabilities. So much is still required scientifically. However the question can 
still be posed of industry: what would be ideal and what would be desirable 
in terms of warning time and information content? Also, what are the costs 
and other consequences of incorrect high-activity forecasts? 
 
7. In modeling GICs in a power grid, what is an appropriate level of detail required 
of Earth conductivity (as a three dimensional model or otherwise)? 
 
In practical terms simple conductivity models that vary only with depth 
remain useful for inland continental regions, away from coasts. But what 
about the coasts, where many high-value generating assets are located, due 
to proximity to cooling water and access to fuel? How accurate does industry 
need GIC modeling to be? How quickly do models have to perform to 
provide useful forecast data, and does this imply restricting complexity of 
model to meet targets? 
 
8. What are the characteristics of power transformers that determine their 
susceptibility to GICs and therefore determine the extent of damage sustained 
under different levels of GICs? 
 
Industry data on transformer designs need to be examined in more detail 
(e.g. Lahtinen and Elovaara, 2002). How can transformers be tested or 
certified for compliance with specifications that are intended to reduce 
damage by GICs? 
 
9. What are the transformer failure mechanisms subsequent to damage initiated by 
GICs? 
 
This is related to point eight. Major details are understood from observations 
of GIC damage, but laboratory tests on failure modes are rare. How do 
gassing and other condition monitoring records help? Are there emerging 
industry standards for transformers, for protection against GICs and the 
subsequent deterioration leading to failure? What other work needs to be 
done here? 
 
10. Where should scientists go to gain access to industry archives, particularly 
archives of any GIC measurements obtained concurrently with network data (i.e. 
network configuration and connections, DC resistances of transmission lines and 
transformers and station earthing resistances)? 
 
The absence of open source data is a continuing problem for scientists, 
although the commercial issues are appreciated. However some progress, 
perhaps through support from national industry regulators, industry or 
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professional societies would be helpful. Also, there is a need for long term 
monitoring in any given power grid, as the electrical (near-DC) 
characteristics of each grid changes over time. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Compared with the ‘do knows’ in our list, our ‘don’t knows’ may be more 
contentious within the scientific community. It may be debated which items are 
most important at the present time, understanding that other issues might yet 
become more relevant. However by making scientific progress on our current ‘don’t 
knows’ we do believe that scientists will improve their ability to monitor, model and 
predict the impacts of space weather and GICs on power grids.  
 
Solar cycle 24 is just beginning and we can expect that the space weather hazard 
to ground-based technologies will increase, just as it did during the up-turn of 
previous cycles. The main message of the Hermanus workshop is therefore that we 
need a wider discussion on all of the issues, not just within the GIC science 
community, but also within industry and wider society. We hope that our lists will go 
some way to start that discussion and promote much needed future research. 
 
A future scientific workshop is planned for 2010/2011, again in South Africa. This 
meeting is planned to be more broadly based than the recent one was, involving 
invitations to specialists from outside the UK and South Africa. At this meeting we 
will discuss what progress has been made against our list of ‘don’t knows’ and, in 
general, discuss progress on GIC risk assessment and on the geomagnetic hazard. 
We would also like to be able to consider the wider impacts of GIC, for example 
within pipeline and railway networks.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 The most powerful solar flares recorded since 1976. Those shown in 
boldface are post year 2000. ‘X-Ray Class’ denotes flare magnitude in units of 10-4 
W/m2, between one and eight Angstroms wavelength. 
Source: http://spaceweather.com/solarflares/topflares.html 
 
 
 
Rank Year/Month/Day X-Ray Class 
1 2003/11/04 X28+ 
2 2001/04/02 X20.0 
2 1989/08/16 X20.0 
3 2003/10/28 X17.2 
4 2005/09/07 X17 
5 1989/03/06 X15.0 
5 1978/07/11 X15.0 
6 2001/04/15 X14.4 
7 1984/04/24 X13.0 
7 1989/10/19 X13.0 
8 1982/12/15 X12.9 
9 1982/06/06 X12.0 
9 1991/06/01 X12.0 
9 1991/06/04 X12.0 
9 1991/06/06 X12.0 
9 1991/06/11 X12.0 
9 1991/06/15 X12.0 
10 1982/12/17 X10.1 
10 1984/05/20 X10.1 
11 2003/10/29 X10 
11 1991/01/25 X10.0 
11 1991/06/09 X10.0 
12 1982/07/09 X9.8 
12 1989/09/29 X9.8 
13 1991/03/22 X9.4 
13 1997/11/06 X9.4 
14 1990/05/24 X9.3 
15 2006/12/05 X9 
15 1980/11/06 X9 
15 1992/11/02 X9 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Top: Aurora near LaOtto, Indiana, USA (41.29º geographic north) 
photographed on 29 October at the time when the CME that emanated from 
sunspot 486 at 12:18 UT on 28 October 2003 hit Earth's magnetic field, triggered 
an extreme geomagnetic storm and pushed the auroral oval as far south as Texas. 
(Photo credit: Robert B. Slobins, as submitted to www.Spaceweather.com). Bottom: 
A related later auroral event seen from Selsey, in the south of England (at 47.2 ºN 
magnetic north) taken on 31 Oct 2003. (Photo credit: Pete Lawrence, 
www.digitalsky.org.uk). 
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Figure 2  The monthly sunspot number (blue line) and monthly CME count during 
solar cycle 23.The number of CMEs (and consequent geomagnetic activity) tends 
to follow the sunspot cycle but remains high even as the sunspot number declines. 
There are only rarely times when the CME count drops to zero or, equivalently, 
when the likelihood of major magnetic storms disappears. (Sunspot data courtesy 
of NGDC/NOAA. CME data courtesy of NASA/ESA SOHO/LASCO). 
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Figure 3 The complexity of ionospheric current vectors are shown, derived from UK 
and Scandinavian magnetometer data near the time of the storm commencement 
during the July 15th 2000 magnetic storm. The scale vector at top left is 8 nT/sec. 
Coloured spots denote measured GIC at six points in national power grids at the 
time (red denotes a GIC flowing to the Earth) and in one gas pipeline in Finland. 
Spot size is proportional to measured current: the largest current in this image was 
around 11A at the time. Data are courtesy of Finnish Meteorological Institute 
(IMAGE), Lancaster University (SAMNET), British Geological Survey, Scottish 
Power plc and Gasum Oy. 
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Figure 4 Failure in a large South African generator transformer three weeks after 
the Halloween storm of October 2003.  The disruption of the winding and insulation 
by the arcing fault at the time of final failure is clear. The arcing fault also destroys 
evidence that might lead to a better understanding of the progression of damage 
after initiation by the geomagnetic current event. 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Results of dissolved gas analysis (ppm – left scale) for two similar 
generator transformers in South Africa (labelled 1 and 2). This illustrates continued 
gas generation after the short geomagnetic storm (only a few hours) and an 
apparent sensitivity to transformer loading (MW – same scale) during the following 
months. The ratios of the different gases also indicate low temperature degradation 
of paper insulation. Both transformers were removed from service approximately 
six months after the storm. Note: the dashed lines indicate the increase from 
nominal pre- to immediate post-storm levels for each data type.
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Figure 6 Large storms identified by the peak in the 24-hour running average (aa*) 
of the 3-hour geomagnetic aa index against time, since 1868, overlain with monthly 
smoothed solar sunspot number. A threshold of 80 nT has been used to better 
identify the largest individual storms. 
 
